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I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, the United States is estimated to lose billions of dollars due to
piracy and counterfeiting in China alone. As the 2005 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers stated: "According to some
reports, inadequate enforcement has resulted in infringement levels in China
that have remained at 90% or above in 2004 for virtually every form of
intellectual property, while estimated U.S. losses due to the piracy of
copyrighted materials alone range between $2.5 billion and $3.8 billion
annually."'
Commentators have already widely discussed the piracy and counterfeiting
problems in China. Instead of repeating this discussion or challenging the
misleading figures supplied by U.S. business groups, this Essay focuses on the
recent debate about whether the U.S. administration should file a formal
complaint against China with the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) over inadequate enforcement of intellectual property
rights.
Taking a position contrary to some policymakers and business groups, this
Essay begins by explaining why the administration should not file a formal
complaint against China with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. It then
discusses the consequences of filing such a complaint. It contends that such
action is likely to result in a new "cycle of futility," similar to the cycles
created by the American intellectual property policy toward China in the 1980s
and early 1990s. To avoid these cycles, the Essay highlights four remedial
areas on which the administration and the business community should focus.
The Essay concludes with three observations that provide insight into the
piracy and counterfeiting problems in China and the difficulty in alleviating
those problems.
II. THE WTO COMPLAINT
There are at least four reasons why the U.S. administration should not file
a formal complaint against China with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body over
inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights. First, although the
1 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 97 (2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/ Reports
_Publications/2005/2005_NTEReport/asset-upload-file383_7446.pdf.
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights2 (TRIPs
Agreement) stipulates that each WTO member state needs to provide effective
intellectual property enforcement, it does not define what constitutes
"effective" protection. There is no doubt that a software piracy rate of 90%,
as stated in a recent study by the Business Software Alliance, provides strong
evidence of ineffective enforcement.3 However, critics have challenged the
accuracy of these figures. As Gary Shapiro, the president of the Consumer
Electronics Association, described in The Economist magazine, the list of
figures was "[a]bsurd on its face" and "patently obscene."4 Because the
figures were controversial and were supplied by a self-interested trade group,
the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel is very unlikely to take them at face value.
Even if the panel could come up with a figure that can be used to determine
"effective" enforcement, the United States might ultimately lack sufficient
non-anecdotal evidence to show that China has failed its obligations. As of
this writing, U.S. companies have been uncooperative in supplying to the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) piracy and counterfeiting data in
China. Small and midsize companies, in particular, remain reluctant to
disclose information, lest they wreck their hard-earned guanxi (personal
connections) and face political or business repercussions. While some
disagree with the administration's WTO-based strategy, others find it wise to
free ride on the enforcement efforts of their competitors and partners. Indeed,
a WTO action would be a win-win for companies that choose to stay out of the
conflict: If the United States prevails, they will benefit from the ruling. If the
United States fails, however, they will have demonstrated loyalty to their
Chinese connections throughout the process.
Second, even if the United States were able to amass the needed evidence,
the WTO process poses structural challenges to a general complaint about
inadequate intellectual property enforcement. Virtually all of the existing
WTO cases focus on the nonimplementation of specific provisions, rather than
a lack of general enforcement. The closest cases were those filed by the
United States against Greece and the European Communities, in which the
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
3 See BUS. SOFTwARE ALLIANCE & INT'L DATA CORP., SECOND ANNUAL BSA AND IDC
GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STuDY 3 (2005), http://www.bsa.org/globalstudy/upload/2005-
Global-Study-English.pdf.
4 Software Piracy: BSA or Just BS?, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 93.
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United States claimed that Greece violated articles 41 and 61 of the TRIPs
Agreement by not providing effective enforcement of intellectual property
rights.5 The cases were eventually settled.
If the United States challenges China on nonimplementation grounds, it is
likely to be very difficult, as most of the laws required under the TRIPs
Agreement are already on the books. In the wake of WTO accession, China
revamped its copyright, patent, and trademark laws while introducing new
implementing regulations, administrative measures, and judicial interpreta-
tions. It also made many substantial revisions to its intellectual property laws
in response to agreements signed with the United States in the early 1990s.
If the United States goes after China on nonenforcement grounds, however,
the TRIPs Agreement might even be on China's side. Under article 41(5) of
the Agreement, a WTO member state is not required to devote more resources
to intellectual property enforcement than to other areas of law enforcement.6
If China were able to show that their enforcement problems with piracy and
counterfeiting were no more excessive than their problems with, say, tax
collection (which are very serious), China would be likely to prevail. It is hard
to imagine any country putting intellectual property protection ahead of tax
collection. Nor does the WTO require it to do so.
To some extent, the intellectual property problems in China are not that
different from those experienced in the United States and other developed
countries, which have been struggling with massive unauthorized copying
problems since the emergence of Napster and other file-sharing technologies.
In the past two years, the recording and movie industries have filed many
rounds of lawsuits against individuals distributing copyrighted works illegally
via peer-to-peer networks. The file-sharing problems are so important that
courts around the world are now inundated with cases addressing secondary
copyright liability.
At some point, we just need to recognize that intellectual property, due to
its abstract nature, is generally treated differently from physical property. It
does not matter whether it is in China or in the United States. Even in major
U.S. cities, it is not uncommon to notice street vendors selling pirated CDs and
DVDs in the presence of police officers. Obviously, the officers are not
' Request for Constitutions by the United States, Greece-Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rightsfor Motion Pictures and Television Programs, WT/DS125/1 (May 7, 1998);
Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities-Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rightsfor Motion Pictures and Television Programs, WT/DS 124/1 (May
7, 1998).
6 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 41(5).
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buying the fake products. However, the fact that they have no prob-
lems-moral or legal-with the street vending activities has greatly weakened
the United States' case against China.7 Moreover, many intellectual property
rights holders have complained about the difficulty of convincing federal
prosecutors to take piracy and counterfeiting cases seriously. Some district
attorneys' offices, they maintain, just refuse to take those cases.
Third, the WTO dispute settlement process does not guarantee victory for
the United States. For example, in June 2000, the United States lost its WTO
dispute with the European Union over section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright
Act, which enables restaurants and small establishments to play copyrighted
music without compensating copyright holders In another ruling, although
the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel upheld sections 301-310 of the Trade Act
of 1974, it curtailed the ability of the U.S. administration to pursue retaliatory
actions before exhausting all remedies permissible under the WTO rules.9
Most recently, the Caribbean islands of Antigua and Barbuda successfully
challenged U.S. laws on Internet and telephone gambling."
To be certain, the United States and the European Union dominated the
dispute settlement process in the first few years of the WTO's existence.
Indeed, many of the United States' losses came from its archrival, the
European Communities. However, in recent years, less developed countries
have had more frequent use of the WTO process. If the WTO rules are on
their side, even tiny Caribbean islands can prevail over a trading giant like the
United States. We could only imagine what it would be like when an emerging
trading power like China decides to face off with the United States.
As in most WTO cases, it is unlikely that either China or the United States
will win the entire case. Because of the customary length and detail of the
WTO panel reports, both the winning and losing parties are likely to score
some important points. This works in China's favor: Even if it loses on a
majority of claims, it would still score some wins it can use in future WTO
litigation. But if the United States loses, any minor points it scores will not be
' Arguably, state police officers can claim that it is not within their jurisdiction to combat
the federal crimes of commercial piracy and counterfeiting. However, their behavior remains
troubling and greatly weakens the moral strength of the United States' arguments against China.
8 See Panel Report, UnitedStates-Section 110(5) ofthe U.S. CopyrightAct, WT/DS/160/R
(June 15, 2000).
9 See Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
'0 See Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
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sufficient to compensate for the symbolic effect of losing the first WTO case
against China. Such a loss would also have a devastating impact that would
spill over into other areas of international trade.
Finally, the WTO dispute settlement process, if used improperly, will hurt
the United States' long-term interests in promoting international trade.
Because China is currently undergoing a transition to full compliance with
WTO rules, well-conceived challenges are needed to provide guidance.
Indeed, foreign pushes are sometimes needed to fuel China's intellectual
property reforms, and WTO challenges can help maximize the benefits created
by China's accession to the WTO by breaking up local monopolies and
entrenched piracy interests. Ifthe right complaint is brought, the United States
might even be able to enlist the support of local companies, which are equally
concerned about the anticompetitive behavior of these monopolies and
entrenched players.
China spent fifteen years negotiating exhaustively for its entry into the
WTO. While policymakers and commentators initially expressed reservations
about the country's joining the international trading body, most of them, by
now, have agreed that China's accession to the WTO will benefit the
international trading system in the long run. It is, therefore, important that the
U.S. administration be patient and provide guidance as China learns to become
a respectable member of the international trading body. A bad WTO case will
not only be unhelpful in liberating trade, but could potentially backfire on the
entire international community. It would be worse than not bringing the case
at all.
III. THE NEW CYCLE OF FUTILITY
The recent debate about intellectual property protection in China is
reminiscent of the debate American policymakers had a decade ago. In the
1980s, the United States had a significant trade deficit against China, as it does
today. Because intellectual property-based goods are among the key exports
that could help reduce the deficit, the first Bush and Clinton administrations
sought to induce China to strengthen its intellectual property protection by
threatening the country with economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of
most-favored-nation status, and opposition to entry into the WTO.
[Vol. 34:143
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That policy had been largely ineffective." While it helped develop a new
intellectual property system and the accompanying enforcement infrastructure,
it had become largely futile once those goals were achieved. In fact, it had
wasted the United States' hard-earned political capital that could have been
spent on other difficult cross-border issues, such as terrorism, nuclear
nonproliferation, illegal arms sales, environmental degradation, drug
trafficking, refugees, illegal immigration, and corruption. The policy also
jeopardized the United States' longstanding interests in promoting free trade,
human rights, and the rule of law.
Even worse, the policy had resulted in what I have termed the "cycle of
futility"-a stalemate that advanced the interests of neither China nor the
United States. That cycle went as follows: The United States began by
threatening China with trade sanctions (often with an ancillary threat of
nonrenewal of China's most-favored-nation status). China responded with
threats of retaliatory sanctions of a similar amount. After several months of
negotiations, both countries agreed to an eleventh-hour compromise that
usually led to a written document. While intellectual property protection
improved during the first few months immediately following the agreements,
piracy and counterfeiting problems worsened once international attention was
diverted. Within a short period of time, American businesses again com-
plained to the U.S. government, and the cycle repeated itself.
The first cycle began when the United States placed China on the Priority
Watch List in the late 1980s. This cycle resulted in the 1992 Memorandum of
Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United States on the Protection
of Intellectual Property (1992 MOU), 2 which revamped the Chinese
intellectual property system. The second cycle emerged two years later,
leading eventually to the 1995 Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property
Rights (1995 Agreement), 3 which included a detailed action plan that laid the
foundation of the current enforcement infrastructure. Notwithstanding this
action plan and the "special enforcement" efforts taken by the Chinese
authorities, a third cycle emerged in less than a year. This time, China and the
United States were unable to reach a new agreement. Instead, they agreed to
a document that mostly reaffirmed China's commitments previously made
" See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in
the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131, 136-54 (2000).
'2 Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United States on the
Protection of Intellectual Property, P.R.C.-U.S., Jan. 17, 1992, 34 I.L.M. 677.
" Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, P.R.C.-U.S., Feb. 26, 1995,34 I.L.M.
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under the 1995 Agreement while adding only minor provisions to save face for
both parties. 
14
There is no doubt that these cycles and the repeated negotiation sessions
had raised the awareness of intellectual property rights among the Chinese.
However, the repetition had cost the U.S. government credibility and the
support of its business constituency, which increasingly criticized the
government for having a counterproductive U.S.-China bilateral trade policy.
Even worse, the policy had fostered resentment among the Chinese and had
made American ideas and institutions unappealing at a time when transition
countries were busy modeling their laws, institutions, and policies after the
United States.
Today, the U.S. administration is in a similar situation. Although the WTO
rules prevent the United States from effectively threatening China with
unilateral sanctions, the administration could create a new cycle of futility by
threatening to take, or by taking, formal WTO action on a weak case of
inadequate intellectual property enforcement. This new cycle of futility could
develop in one of the following four scenarios.
Scenario One. The United States threatens to file a formal complaint with
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. China responds by undertaking short-term
"special enforcement" of intellectual property rights. While the crackdown
efforts initially satisfy American businesses, the piracy and counterfeiting
problems soon return. Businesses again complain to the USTR, and the cycle
repeats itself.
Scenario Two. The United States files a complaint with the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body. A formal consultation process begins, and China negotiates
with the United States. During the negotiations, China undertakes short-term
"special enforcement" of intellectual property rights that satisfies American
businesses. Because the United States does not have a strong case, it quickly
settles the dispute, lest a bad WTO precedent be established. Although the
piracy and counterfeiting problems initially subside, they return a few months
after the settlement. American businesses again complain to the USTR, and
the cycle repeats itself.
Scenario Three. The United States files a complaint with the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body. Although China negotiates with the United States and has
undertaken several large-scale crackdowns on piracy and counterfeiting, the
" See People's Republic of China Implementation of the 1995 Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement, P.R.C.-U.S., June 17, 1996, available at http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov/cgi-bin/doit.
cgi?204:64:4f93f3ace2c666f04018d7e9716bff4c50cf3513ObOd6def7a7efc473989c29b: 190.
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United States is not satisfied with the results. It requests the establishment of
the dispute settlement panel. The established panel finds for the United States
on most issues concerning intellectual property enforcement. However, it also
allows China to score some important points on public health and public
interests safeguards, as well as on the limitations of the enforcement provisions
of the TRIPs Agreement. China appeals the panel decision to the Appellate
Body, which upholds some of the findings in the lower decision while
rejecting the others. Eager to demonstrate its intention to be a respectful
member of the WTO, China quickly implements the decision of the Appellate
Body. Although intellectual property protection improves initially, piracy and
counterfeiting become rampant again a few months afterwards. American
businesses complain to the USTR, and the cycle repeats itself.
Scenario Four. The United States files a complaint with the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body, which establishes a dispute settlement panel. The panel
finds for the United States, and China appeals to the Appellate Body. After
losing the appeal, China and the United States agree to pursue arbitration to
determine the penalty award. Although the panel determines the award, China
follows the precedent of not paying the penalty as set by the United States in
United States-Section 110(5) of the U. S. Copyright Act. " After many failed
negotiations, the United States files another complaint with the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body. This cycle repeats itself.
Of course, there are many other possible permutations of this new cycle of
futility. Whatever the permutations are, the message is clear: A strategy that
does not result in sustained intellectual property protection will be ineffective.
It does not matter whether China is a WTO member or not. The cycle
appeared in the 1990s, just as it will appear today. In both instances, the
dispute would end up in a stalemate that advances the interests of neither
country. While the United States may have temporary relief, the short-term
improvements in the intellectual property area are insufficient to allow its
businesses to make long-term market decisions.
IV. HOW TO AVOID THE CYCLE OF FUTILITY?
To provide sustained intellectual property protection in China, the U.S.
administration and the American business community need to focus on four
remedial areas.' 6 The first area, obviously, covers laws and enforcement
IS See Panel Report, supra note 8.
16 See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOzO L. REv. 331, 428-37 (2003).
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mechanisms, which were the primary focus of most of the administration's past
bilateral efforts. If the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding and the 1995
Agreement are evaluated for effectiveness, setting up the legal regime and the
accompanying enforcement infrastructure were among their major accomplish-
ments.
The second area is education. Many Chinese are unfamiliar with intellec-
tual property rights and the benefits of such an "alien" concept. The
administration and the business community therefore need to ensure the
Chinese understand what intellectual property is and how it is protected. They
also need to show them the benefits of intellectual property protection and the
disadvantages of not having such protection.
Notwithstanding their importance, educational efforts are often ignored due
to the short-sightedness of policymakers and business executives. American
presidents are limited to two four-year terms, and most CEOs of American
companies do not even last that long. As a result, both the government and the
business community are very reluctant to undertake long-term education
efforts that will not yield immediate results. As policymakers and business
executives would say, quoting John Keynes, "In the long run, we are all dead.
Why would we care?"' 7
Fortunately, there has been gradual improvement in awareness among the
Chinese of intellectual property rights. If you go to China today, there is a
good chance that a taxi driver could tell you what zhishi chanquan (or
intellectual property) is.'" This was not the case a decade ago. There is still
no guarantee that people will respect intellectual property rights once they
know what those rights are and why they should protect them. However, it is
quite certain that people will not respect intellectual property rights if they do
not know what intellectual property is and if they believe those rights will hurt
them, rather than help them.
The third area concerns the development of local stakeholders in the form
of either indigenous industries-such as a local computer industry or a local
pharmaceutical industry-or local artists and inventors. Even though the
stockholders will benefit the Chinese economy, the U.S. administration and the
business community need to help these local industries foster their develop-
ments. They are particularly important, because they will provide the internal
push for legal reforms and will protect the reformist leaders from being
criticized for kowtowing to foreign interests. They also may help hold the
"7 Cf JOHN M. KEYNEs, MONETARY REFORM 88 (1924) ("In the long run, we are all dead.").
'8 Zhishi chanquan is the Chinese translation of intellectual property rights.
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local authorities accountable should the authorities ignore the piracy and
counterfeiting problems-or, worse, participate in such illegal activities.
Today, there are a number of emerging local industries in China, focusing
on such areas as entertainment, software, biotechnology, and semiconductors.
Because of these booming industries, future Chinese intellectual property
policies are likely to be very interesting. Indeed, China is likely to be
"schizophrenic" over those policies. 9 On the one hand, because of the
booming indigenous industries, it wants to have stronger protection of movies,
computer programs, biotechnology, and computer chips. On the other hand,
it wants to limit protection of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and foodstuffs, due
to its large population, concerns about public health issues, and heavy reliance
on agriculture.
The final area focuses on the need for the administration and the business
community need to provide the Chinese with legitimate alternatives-or at
least to help develop an environment that is conducive to the development of
these alternatives. This is particularly true in areas where basic products are
needed, but unaffordable by the local people. Education, scientific research,
and public health are among the prime examples.
Although we might have questioned a decade ago why a Chinese parent
would photocopy a textbook for his or her child when the book was sold for
only US$20, their actions became understandable when we took into account
the fact that many Chinese made less than US$40 per month. After all, very
few Americans would be willing to spend half of their monthly salary on a
textbook, no matter how important it was.
There is no doubt that times have changed, and the economic conditions in
China are much better today than they were a decade ago. However, the
Chinese still have very limited disposable income, and Western prices remain
quite high for the local people, especially when their purchasing power is taken
into consideration. Even more problematic, the prices charged in China are
sometimes higher than those charged in the United States-partly due to a lack
of economy of scale and partly due to the rights holders' eagerness to use
higher prices to compensate for the piracy and counterfeiting losses they
suffered in China. In those situations, providing legitimate alternatives is very
important.
"9 See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 1, 9; Peter K. Yu, The Trust and Distrust of Intellectual Property Rights, 16 REvUE
QUEBECOISE DE DROIT INT'L (forthcoming 2005).
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Hollywood understands the importance of these alternatives. Most of the
movie studios in China now release low-priced audiovisual products dubbed
in the local language with added foreign-language subtitles. On the one hand,
these bargain products provide an affordable alternative that accommodates
local needs. On the other hand, by dubbing the original products in the local
language or including subtitles, the studios successfully make the discounted
products unappealing to consumers in the English-speaking world. This
strategy, therefore, prevents the products from entering other countries as
parallel imports.
Skeptics may still question why the Chinese would buy higher-priced
legitimate copies when the pirated versions are sold for only half of the
discount price. The answer is simple: The customers are getting a better
product--or, at least, they are certain that they are getting the officially
released version of the product. If you get a pirated DVD around the time of
the theatrical release, there is a good chance that the movie was taken using a
camcorder inside a theater. The sound and visual quality is low, the images are
moving around, and you can hear the conversation or laughter of people sitting
nearby. Even if the DVD version of the movie has been officially released,
there is no guarantee that you will be purchasing the high-quality pirated
version duped from the original disc, as compared to a highly-compressed low-
quality copy--or worse, a blank disc. The fact that you are unlikely to see the
vendor again makes it even more difficult for you to protect yourself against
fraudulent activities.
As the Chinese have more disposable income, they are increasingly unlikely
to be satisfied with this type of low-quality entertainment. Instead, they will
be eager to buy higher-priced legitimate goods. Indeed, some commentators
have suggested that China's accession to the WTO will increase the local
living standards to the point that the Chinese will become interested in buying
genuine and luxury products. As forecasted by Ernst & Young, the Chinese
luxury market "is expected to grow 20%, annually until 2008 and then 10%
annually until 2015, when sales are expected to exceed US$11.5 billion."2
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V. CLOSING OBSERVATIONS
Let me close this Essay with three observations. First, there are many
causes of piracy and counterfeiting in China, and it is a mistake to focus only
on the leaders' lack of political will. Commentators and pundits have often
criticized the Chinese authorities for their lack of political will to crack down
on piracy and counterfeiting activities. As one policy analyst put it,
[i]t is laughable to hear excuses from Beijing that they can't
control the 50 pirate CD factories. If they were turning out
thousands of copies of the BBC documentary on the Tiananmen
Square protest-rather than bootleg copies of "The Lion
King"-the factory managers would be sharing a cell with other
dissidents in a heartbeat.21
However, the situation is more complicated than these commentators have
acknowledged. It is naive to believe that governments will consider the
protection of foreign interests a top priority without a related immediate
foreign threat. Even with such a threat, governments are unlikely to provide
continuing protection when the threat is removed. Indeed, if acclaimed
Chinese director Zhang Yimou were to complain about the widespread
unauthorized downloading of his movies by American Internet users, the U.S.
authorities would be unlikely to search the suspects' homes for unauthorized
copies the same way they had searched the homes of suspected terrorists,
which the administration had considered a significant national security threat.
Moreover, as I discussed above, many issues are considered of a higher
priority than intellectual property protection. Two issues that have dominated
the U.S.-China debate thus far are the currency peg and intellectual property
protection. What was seldom mentioned, and yet lurking in the background,
is nuclear nonproliferation-in particular, China's role in the nuclear dispute
between North Korea and the United States.22 If the U.S. government only has
the political capital to take action on one issue, I wonder whether intellectual
property protection would trump the other two issues.
Second, the legal system is not the only option available to protect
intellectual assets, and the litigious approach taken by many American
21 James Shinn, The China Crunch, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1996, at CI.
22 See Michael Hirsh & Melinda Lin, North Korea Hold 'em, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 2005, at
42 (noting Beij ing's critical role in the six-party talks over North Korea's nuclear arms program).
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businesses may not be the most effective strategy in every case.23 For example,
an attorney hired by a Western food manufacturer to combat counterfeits will
find consumer protection laws just as effective a remedy as intellectual
property laws. While commentators are quick to criticize the Communist
system for contributing to the lack of respect for intellectual property rights,
they sometimes overlook the significant emphasis the system has placed on the
protection of the people's well-being. Understanding this emphasis could
benefit many American companies.
H.J. Heinz Company provides an illustrative example.24 When the Chinese
authorities raided the factories that produced counterfeit Heinz baby food, the
company brought with it reporters and a camera crew from the local media.
In doing so, it not only exposed the counterfeiters and created evidence for the
authorities, but also showed the local community the shoddy quality of the fake
products and the unsanitary facilities at the factories. Once consumers knew
how unhealthy and dangerous these products were to little children, they were
reluctant to purchase the products. As a result, the counterfeiting problem was
greatly reduced after a series of well-publicized raids.
Foreign businesses sometimes forget that Chinese officials have to wear
many hats and juggle many different responsibilities. This is especially true
for those working outside the major cities, as they often have to deal with not
only intellectual property issues, but also crime, public health, unemployment,
social welfare, and other economic problems. By focusing on public health,
Heinz successfully converted a foreign problem into a local one, thereby
convincing the local officials to crack down on the problem.
Compared to governments, these businesses are in a stronger position to
combat piracy and counterfeiting in China, as they need only worry about
protecting themselves. If they are able to take a proactive approach that drives
offenders to target their competitors instead, they may not need to worry about
the overarching problem at all. This is similar to putting locks on a house in
a crime-infested neighborhood. Governments, in comparison, have a much
more difficult job. Just like the police or the legislature, they need to think
about the overall protection for the constituents of the entire community-in
this case, all of the American businesses in China.
23 For the discussion ofaltemative strategies used to protect American intellectual assets, see
generally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in
Post-WTO China (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
24 See John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner, Swashbuckling the Pirates: A Communications-
Based Approach to IPR Protection in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND
PRACTICE 409, 426 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
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Finally, the piracy and counterfeiting problems in China are very similar to
the digital piracy problem on the Internet, and what we learn about the latter
may provide insight into the former, and vice versa. When I compare
intellectual property piracy in China to the piracy in the United States in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, people always respond by noting the
unfairness of the comparison. As they contend, piracy, like slavery, was a past
phenomenon in the United States.25 The fact that the country once condoned
slavery does not mean that it should not complain about human trafficking or
serious violations of human rights today.
However, when I mention MP3 piracy, people usually have a more difficult
time responding to the comparison. Oftentimes, they remark that MP3 piracy
is different from piracy in China, because it involves people with a Net culture
who abide by different social norms. If deviations in social norms provide
justification for nonprotection of intellectual property rights, we have to
wonder why we cannot make the same argument for China, which historically
did not abide by the Western norms of intellectual property protection.
To be fair, the piracy problem in China is not the same as the unauthorized
copying problem on the Internet. While the former largely focuses on
commercial copying, the latter consists primarily of private copying. However,
U.S. courts have been reluctant to embrace this public-private, commercial-
noncommercial distinction. In fact, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California stated clearly in A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc. that the use of a file-sharing service could not be considered private use
or "personal use in the traditional sense," partly because the users reap
economic benefits by "get[ting] for free something they would ordinarily have
to buy., 26 Commentators have widely criticized the court's interpretation of
the word "commercial." However, the court's reasoning seems to suggest that
there are remarkable similarities between the Chinese piracy problem and the
unauthorized copying problem on the Internet.
Two years ago, when the recording industry began actively suing individual
end-users whom it suspected of illegally trading music, 27 some commentators
and members of the public suggested that the industry should go after China
instead. This suggestion troubles me greatly, because if we believe that the
25 See Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 127, 138-40 (2003) (challenging the common misconception that
copyright piracy is a past phenomenon for technologically-advanced countries).
26 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
27 See generally Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 907
(2004); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 653 (2005).
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industry should not target American file-sharers due to their lack of under-
standing or belief in the copyright system, we should do the same with respect
to those Chinese who might have similar difficulties. Asking the industry, or
the U.S. Government, to subject a foreign country to treatment that we oppose
happening to ourselves would make a hypocritical foreign intellectual property
policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Chinese intellectual property system did not re-emerge until the early
1980s. The United States, by contrast, has a well-established system with
more than two centuries of development. Yet, despite this centuries-old
system, American individuals have had great difficulty understanding why it
is illegal to reproduce and distribute music online without the copyright
holders' authorization. We could only imagine how much more difficult it is
for the Chinese to understand why they should not reproduce and distribute
intellectual-property-protected works without the rights holders' authorization.
China needs more time, and twenty-five years are just not enough.
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